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As multistakeholder governance has emerged as an important feature in development, new governance 
structures that foster the participation of multiple stakeholders from the public sector, civil society, and 
the private sector have emerged in various fields, ranging from the management of natural resources to 
the provision of public services. To make such governance structures work, it is essential to understand 
how different stakeholders influence decisionmaking and what determines their influence. 
This paper uses Net-Map, an innovative participatory method, to analyze how networking 
influences decisionmaking in multistakeholder governance structures, using the case of the governance 
board of the White Volta River Basin in northern Ghana as an example. The method visualizes both the 
relations between all stakeholders in watershed management as perceived by the 17 members on the 
board and their influence on development outcomes. 
The study suggests that significant effects of social networking are at play beyond the formal 
lines of command and funding as stakeholders in watershed management make decisions. Stakeholders 
are more influential if they participate more prominently in information exchange and provide more 
advice to others. This counterbalances the overrepresentation of government actors on the board. 
Meanwhile some government organizations have a low level of influence, even though they are central in 
giving funding and command. These findings may be interesting for program leaders and policymakers in 
watershed management: when designing governance structures they need to take into account the 
importance of social networking to attain main objectives of watershed development; it is important to 
provide space that allows the exchange of information and advice among stakeholders. Meanwhile, 
policymakers and program leaders as well must consider overrepresentation of social network champions 
in multistakeholder governance structures and the limited capacity of government bodies in social 
networking. The paper serves to introduce not only the specific findings concerning this case study but 
also the participatory research method (Net-Map) that was used. 
Keywords: social networks, natural resource management, multistakeholder governance, 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Multistakeholder forums have become state of the art to address complex governance issues such as water 
management. Both policymakers and community-based organizations have come to appreciate 
multistakeholder forums and boards as solutions to the common problems of participation, particularly of 
minorities, and pluralistic decisionmaking. Nowadays a wide range of experience exists with local, 
national, and international multistakeholder governance boards both in developing and developed 
countries (see Warner 2006 for a comprehensive overview). However, despite an increasing preference 
for multistakeholder governance boards in natural resources management, there is little understanding of 
how these boards—often characterized by limited formal decisionmaking and enforcement capacity—can 
influence governance decisions and the achievement of governance goals. One particular question is, to 
what extent do representatives on multistakeholder boards use their influence on the boards and their 
positions in the wider network of stakeholders to influence whether the board achieves its goals? 
Sociologists have long argued that power and influence are fundamental properties of social 
structure; depending on the patterns of relations actors have, their levels of power and influence can vary 
(Blau 1964; Marsden and Friedkin 1994). According to Granovetter (1985) relations between individuals 
or organizations—such as those maintained in multistakeholder boards—are embedded in actual social 
networks and do not exist as separate, abstract, idealized relationships that follow the rules established by 
their boards. Embeddedness relates to the way an actor is positioned in the wider social network, defined 
by the direct and indirect relationships the actor maintains with other types of actors in the network. The 
way an actor is embedded in a relational network can impose constraints on the actor or offer 
opportunities, and actors with fewer constraints and more opportunities may be able to exercise more 
influence. Beyond common contract and economic theories, embeddedness in social networks can explain 
the influence an actor exercises in decisionmaking processes; the occurrence of decisions that cause 
change can be understood as an outcome of various relationships among the actors or stakeholders. For 
example, an actor with more links to other actors or with more opportunities to connect different groups 
to each other may be able to exercise more influence in decisionmaking. However, the actors are linked 
by numerous kinds of ties (for example, giving money or giving information), and to explain the 
influence of an actor it might not suffice to ask only, “How many links does this actor have?” One may 
also have to ask, “What kind of links does this actor have?” 
This paper presents empirical results from a study of how the underlying social networks among 
stakeholders in the management of a large watershed in northern Ghana, the White Volta River Basin, 
determine the influence these stakeholders have on achieving general development and environmental 
goals set by a board of stakeholders, such as negotiating water use between environmental and human 
demands and facilitating the proper registration of water users. The White Volta Basin Board is a 
multistakeholder governance mechanism for watershed management. In this study the board was 
subjected to an analysis concerning the perceptions of board members regarding the influence of each of 
the other members—altogether there are 17 member organizations on the board—and other external 
stakeholders on achieving the board’s goals. For this study a participatory network-mapping method (Net-
Map) was developed that allowed the analysis of the relationships’ effects on, for example, exchanging 
information, giving advice, providing funding, or being in command as well as the perceived power of 
actors within these networks. The information was analyzed with tools of social network analysis deriving 
parameters that describe the embeddedness of each actor in each of these networks. Using correlation and 
multivariate regression tools, these parameters could then be related to data regarding the perceived 
influence of board members. The relation between members’ embeddedness in social networks on one 
hand and their influence on goal-oriented decisionmaking on the other allows for reasoning about over- 
and underrepresentation of interests in multistakeholder governance and for designing governance 
mechanisms that take those into account. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of key theoretical and 
methodological works that have discussed the issue of social networks and influence in multistakeholder  
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governance boards. Section 3 presents the hypotheses to be tested and describes the study context, the 
research methods used, and the data-processing and analytical tools applied. Section 4 presents the 
network graphs and parameters derived from the social network analysis tools and the results from testing 
the hypotheses. The paper concludes by summarizing the overall findings and deriving some policy 
implications.  
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2.  GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
The articulation of public and community interest such as natural resource management often requires the 
collaboration of various stakeholder groups. However, the setting up of organizational entities that 
facilitate the integration of interests of multiple stakeholders in a sort of common governance structure is 
a recent phenomenon emerging out of the need for a more inclusive and effective method for 
multistakeholder participation. In the past, a lack of inclusiveness has often led to decisions that caused 
overuse of natural resources and marginalization of the interests of less powerful groups such as 
indigenous people, resource-poor farmers, and women. Many natural resources are common goods, and 
therefore the issues concerning their use and exploitation can often not be addressed appropriately by a 
single set of governmental decisionmakers or other decisionmakers but require cooperation between many 
different stakeholders. Unless all parties are involved in one way or another in working out solutions, 
implementing actions, and monitoring results, such issues are unlikely to be resolved (Rukato and Osborn 
2001). 
The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 alerted the world to the pressing problems in every 
area where humans affect the environment and put natural resource management firmly on the agenda of 
the international community. The resulting Agenda 21 manifested the important roles various stakeholder 
groups play in the governance of natural resources including women, indigenous peoples, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business and industry, workers, trade unions, the science and 
technology industry, and famers and local authorities, among others. Multistakeholder processes aim to 
bring together all those stakeholders whose interests are at stake in resource management debates in a new 
form of communication and decisionmaking structure. They involve finding practical ways to recognize 
the rights of, and the risks faced by, all those involved (Hemmati et al. 2002). 
Multistakeholder governance goes beyond traditional concepts of hierarchic organization. It is 
based on pluralistic principles such as good governance, democracy, participation, equity and justice, 
unity in diversity, transparency, inclusiveness, legitimacy, and accountability. Arguments that make the 
case for multistakeholder processes include the following: 
•  multistakeholder governance promotes better decisions by means of a wider input from different 
sides and the integration of various viewpoints, 
•  multistakeholder governance builds trust through honoring each participant’s contribution, 
•  multistakeholder governance generates mutual benefits through the use of complementary 
resources and the generation of synergies in their joint use, and 
•  multistakeholder governance creates commitment through participants’ identifying with the 
outcome and thus increasing the likelihood of successful implementation. 
A problem in multistakeholder governance is that people often do not take ownership of and 
responsibility for the decisionmaking process (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). This can lead to pseudo 
representation and to decisions made by only a few dominant actors. The challenge is to get a fair and 
unbiased understanding of who the relevant stakeholders are and get all stakeholders involved without 
jeopardizing the interests of any or overburdening stakeholders with time and other commitments. 
There are many ways to design multistakeholder involvement, ranging from governments’ 
consulting stakeholders to their creating multistakeholder platforms, formal partnerships, and joint 
ventures. One particular way of organizing multiple-stakeholder processes is setting up decisionmaking 
boards in which the various stakeholders have voting and decisionmaking rights. Watershed boards, for 
example, are composed of interested governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders that collaborate in 
the management of water and related natural resources at the scale of a watershed. 
There is considerable variability in watershed boards’ goals and strategic orientation, their 
effectiveness, their stakeholder composition, the way stakeholder participation is achieved, the voting 
systems they use, their leadership, their financing, their decisionmaking procedures, their efficiency, and 
their temporal scale. International river commissions have been developed for many rivers that touch 
more than one country (such as the Mekong River Commission, the Volta Basin Authority). Individual  
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countries install bodies such as water resources commissions (for example, Water Resources Commission 
of the Republic of Ghana), and even at the subnational level, multistakeholder bodies are instituted to 
coordinate the governance of river basins or sub-basins (for example, the White Volta Basin Board as a 
subcommittee of the Water Resources Commission of the Republic of Ghana). 
These multi-stakeholder organizations may be legally entitled to make binding decisions. In many 
cases, however, they play a mainly coordinating and advisory role. The underlying assumption is that 
coordination will improve the decision-making of individual agencies involved. Increased collaboration 
might inspire synergy effects and help to mitigate conflicts of interest (for example in the case of water 
resource management between agricultural, industrial, environmental and household uses of water). 
However, coordinating multistakeholder collaboration is not always straightforward. If 
multistakeholder organizations consist of a combination of government and civil society organizations, 
different organizational cultures may have to be reconciled. Also, the participatory character of 
multistakeholder organizations might clash with the more hierarchical organizational structure of some of 
the organizations involved. Within the multistakeholder organization, different forms of interaction are 
required that follow consensus building rather than rules of authority. For example, although a 
representative from a ministry of agriculture represents an organization wherein he or she is bound by 
clear line hierarchies (and it is important that the representatives on the multistakeholder board have the 
authority to fully represent the organization), when working for the multistakeholder organization, this 
same person might need to interact with representatives at different hierarchical levels from other 
ministries, traditional authorities, and NGOs. None of these has a predefined formal authority over the 
other because they refer to separate systems of hierarchy. To stick to the idea of multistakeholder 
governance, actors must interact through negotiating collaboration and exchange of information and 
advice rather than through following formal lines of command and hierarchical relations. In 
multistakeholder governance not only formal but also informal aspects of power and influence of the 
actors become immanent. 
However, although multistakeholder bodies are strongly promoted by international actors, the 
knowledge about how and why they influence policymaking and implementation is still scarce. Widmer 
and Frey (2006) argue that this is mainly due to a lack of knowledge about appropriate methodologies for 
analysis. Lately there has been a trend of applying social network research tools to the understanding of 
the relationships among board members (Brinkerhoff 1996; Olsson 2007), following a general trend shift 
that began in the second half of the 20th century away from individualist, essentialist, and atomistic 
explanations and toward more relational, contextual, and systemic understandings (Borgatti and Foster 
2003). In social network analysis the power or influence of an actor is often seen as a result of his or her 
position in the network, for example, the number of links someone has (the actor’s degree centrality). In 
this context, Granovetter’s (1985) argument, that the decisionmaking process reflects only the underlying 
social network structure, puts into question the role of such boards in supporting change processes. The 
question is, to what extent is the board actually able to guarantee pluralistic decisionmaking and good 
governance in the presence of power and influence in the underlying social relationships? Thus, the 
formal and informal networks can, on one hand, help these organizations to be inclusive and 
nonhierarchical, but there is the risk, on the other hand, that existing networks benefit only a limited 
number of well-connected, powerful actors and manifest existing structures of clientelism and elite 
capture. 
Still there are few studies that shed light on the dynamics that occur when decisions are made on 
multistakeholder boards; most of them concern the corporate sector, where multistakeholder approaches 
are less common. Donaldson and Dunfee (1994), for example, argue that social contracting can best be 
understood and applied in organizational settings if it is perceived and treated as a network governance 
process, emphasizing the processes by which trust is built among corporate board members. Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001) show how external network ties determine a board’s ability to contribute to 
decisions of strategic importance. They find that the strategic content of social network ties, not simply 
the number of ties, is an important influence on corporate governance. The same authors also deal with 
the issue of limited board involvement and find that this is determined by the lack of board power.  
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In a different governance context Boerzel (1997) analyzes European policy networks and finds 
that these networks constitute arenas for nonstrategic, communicative action, providing solutions for 
collective action problems and allowing for more efficient and legitimate policy mapping. However, she 
also warns about the ambiguity of policy networks, which can, depending on their implementation and 
governance, either enhance or reduce the efficiency and legitimacy of policymaking. Thus, although 
multistakeholder governance can provide for more inclusive governance processes, the dangers of 
inefficiency or elite capture should not be underestimated. 
In the natural resource management literature Folke et al. (2005) argue that natural resources 
governance systems often self-organize as social networks with teams and actor groups that draw on 
various knowledge systems and experiences for the development of a common understanding and 
common policies. However, key persons often provide leadership, trust, vision, and meaning, and they 
help transform the governance system into a learning environment. They further argue that the emergence 
of bridging organizations lowers the costs of collaboration and conflict resolution. In other words, they 
argue that the functionality of boards, such as those in watershed management, depends on the leadership 
of certain key actors. The above studies, however, all focus on analyzing just one kind of link (or simply 
asking, Is there a link between a and b?), whereas the interactions that constitute multistakeholder 
governance consist of a number of different kinds of formal and informal links, which in combination 
affect the governance outcome and the power of different actors in the process. 
In conclusion, there is ample evidence in the literature for the existence of multiple effects of the 
underlying social networks on the way decisions are made on watershed management boards and in other 
multistakeholder governance organizations. The main question now is how this actually happens. What 
are the mechanisms and reasons that make social networks influence and even determine the impact of 
multistakeholder organizations? How do formal and informal links affect this process? Drawing from 
social network analysis, there are a number of network phenomena that can help one understand the 
relation between influence and networking among stakeholders in natural resource management. 
Information exchange. One may expect that actors that are well connected are better informed, 
and this puts them into positions from which they can make better decisions than those that are less well 
informed. Other actors in the network will realize this and follow the better informed in their 
decisionmaking; hence the better informed gain influence. Also, in esteem-based relations, well-informed 
actors may find it easier to make others follow their decisions because the less informed may take the 
better informed as references or models (Erickson 1988; Sparrowe and Liden 1997, 2005). Further, due to 
their capacity to inform others, some of the better-informed actors can become opinion leaders. A testable 
information-exchange hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Influence in decisionmaking depending on one’s role in information 
exchange: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on the way they are 
embedded in the exchange of information among network actors. 
Funding relationships. In a resource-poor environment the ability to both give and get funding 
can affect the influence of actors in decisionmaking (Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch 1980). The ability to 
give funding is closely linked to the ability to set the agenda, even if the funder is located at a distant 
place (such as  in a donor country): by determining what the funds have to be used for, funders can 
structure the content and degree of activity on the ground, even if they are marginal to the local social 
network. The ability to get funding improves the economic capacity of an actor and hence the possibility 
of exercising influence and achieving goals. Furthermore, an actor’s ability to link (or refuse to link) other 
actors to these funds increases his or her control over other actors in the network, his or her activities, and 
his or her capacity to persuade those actors to follow his or her decisions. In network theory the 
incapacity to provide access to funding to others can be operationalized as constraint. An actor 
experiences a constraint when this actor’s relational investments directly or indirectly involve only one 
other actor (alter). If those that receive funding from one particular actor all have other potential funding 
sources, this actor/funder is highly constrained. If they do not have alternative funding sources in the 
neighborhood, they cannot constrain the actor’s behavior. The more constrained the actor, the fewer  
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opportunities he or she has to exercise influence. From the foregoing, the following hypothesis was 
developed: 
Hypothesis 2. Influence in decisionmaking depending on access to funding: The influence 
of actors in a governance network depends on the constraints they face to providing 
funding; if others do not need an actor to acquire funding, the actor is less influential. 
Lines of command. Command relates to activities with which an actor seeks to influence other 
actors to behave in a specific way, and in the case of noncompliance, the actor can revert to formal 
mechanisms of sanctioning. The hierarchical organization of social networks may imply command 
structures wherein certain entities, often central government organizations or traditional village 
authorities, set laws and rules and seek other entities, such as local governments, private NGOs, and 
community based organizations, to comply with those. Who is in command can influence decisionmaking 
processes at different levels. In a truly participatory multistakeholder system, the formal lines of 
command would not be the main determinants of influence of actors on the governance outcome. 
However, often a central government organization still considers itself the leading decisionmaker 
regardless of whether a multistakeholder governance system with democratic decisionmaking processes is 
installed. Other actors in the governance system recognize the influence or, depending on their positions, 
reject it. 
  Hypothesis 3. Influence in decisionmaking depending on command authority: The 
influence of actors in a governance network depends on the extent to which they can 
command the actors in the network. 
Embeddedness in the advice network. Advice relates to activities with which an actor seeks to 
influence other actors to behave in a certain way, but the actor has no means of enforcing this behavior. In 
the context of water resource management, actors give advice to promote environmentally beneficial 
behavior. Whether the advice is actually accepted and the desired activities are undertaken is strongly 
linked to the advisor’s embeddedness in the social networks and the trust in the advisor’s capacity by 
those who receive and use the advice (Rousseau et al. 1998; Kilpatrick and Bell 1998). Those actors that 
are more prominently embedded in the advice network—that provide advice to others—are likely to 
exercise more influence and power in decisions that help to achieve preset goals; the credibility they 
experience in the advice network reflects the influence they can exercise on other watershed 
management–related decisions. The foregoing leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4. Influence in decisionmaking depending on giving advice: The influence of 
actors in a governance network depends on the way they are embedded in giving advice. 
Brokerage regarding advice. Weak ties are fundamental in influencing behavior as they provide 
local bridges to otherwise disconnected parts of the whole network as well as links to external sources of 
information (Granovetter 1983; Hansen 1999; Levin and Cross 2004). Burt (1992) revised Granovetter’s 
(1983) hypothesis about the “strength of weak ties” and suggested that rather than the weakness of the tie, 
it is the bridging function that makes the difference. Those actors that can span the “structural holes” of 
the network, brokering the access to advice of distinct subgroups, become influential players in 
decisionmaking in the network, at times even being able to filter and block information. By measuring the 
extent of structural holes in an advice network, for example, it may be possible to gauge the actor’s 
influence on enabling this advice and on decisions that positively contribute to resource-management-
relevant goals. 
Hypothesis 5. Influence in decisionmaking depending on brokering advice: The influence 
of actors in a governance network depends on their ability to link different network 
groups and broker the communication of advice.  
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3.  METHODOLOGY 
This study applies social network analysis to research on governance and decisionmaking processes in a 
multistakeholder board instituted to improve watershed governance in a river basin in northern Ghana. 
The role of the White Volta Basin Board is to coordinate the activities of those organizations. that 
can actually regulate, enforce, and provide advice about issues of fishing, building, pollution, irrigation, 
and so forth in the field; most of these organizations are members on the board. This includes, for 
example, the ministry of food and agriculture, the water and sanitation authority and the district 
assemblies. Although some of the member organizations have enforcement capacity, the board itself does 
not. This is why the role of giving advice and the underlying social networks are becoming so important 
in the management of the watershed. The 17-member board includes representatives of many regional 
governmental agencies involved in water resource management, the eight district assemblies in the basin, 
one NGO representative, the research sector, and the regional House of Chiefs (representing the 
traditional authorities). 
The research question investigated in this study is how patterns of social interaction among the 
members of the board and other stakeholders affect how they influence whether the board achieves its 
environmental and economic goals. Influence in this study is understood as the probability that one actor 
can affect the achievement of environmental and development goals according to his or her own will, 
even despite resistance of other actors in the governance system. 
The underlying definition of influence was adapted from Max Weber’s definition of power: 
“Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will even despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1922, 
53). Early conceptual formulations and empirical studies focused on interpersonal power relations. During 
the past decades, however, many works dealt with the power of organizations, comparing levels of power 
between organizations at different hierarchical levels and with different attributes (Cook, Emerson, and 
Gillmore 1983; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988; Rowley 1997). One prominent approach, the 
resource dependence approach, suggests that organizations are powerful relative to others to the extent 
that they control resources needed by others and that they can reduce their dependencies on others for 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
Other sociological approaches suggest that power depends on the emergent properties in 
interpersonal relations and social interaction. Blau (1964), for example, argues that rewards and acts of 
gratitude are important determinants of social interaction. An individual for whom another individual has 
done a service is expected to express gratitude and return a service when the occasion arises. The same 
may hold true for organizations and their representatives. Failure to express appreciation and to 
reciprocate tends to stamp the organization as ungrateful; it does not deserve to be helped any more. If the 
organization properly reciprocates, the social rewards serve as inducements to extend further assistance 
and trigger the creation of a mutual exchange of services and a social bond leading to inter-organizational 
dependencies. The most powerful organizations are those that are able to develop the strongest social 
bonds, allowing them to demand reciprocal services. 
In conclusion, regardless of whether the source of power is dependence or social bonds, power 
can be seen as the capacity of actors within a social relationship to carry out activities according their 
interests even despite the resistance of others. 
Preliminary tests in the study region in northern Ghana showed that the term power had a 
negative connotation or that it was used only to describe formal hierarchical authority. To avoid 
misunderstandings, the term influence was used in the interviews describing a mix of hierarchical 
command structure, power, influence, pressure, persuasion, and social bonding. During the interviews, 
representatives were asked to rate how influential the actors in the network were concerning the 
achievement of the Basin Board’s environmental and development goals.  
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The research methodology (Net-Map) developed for this study focuses on the participatory 
visualization of network actors, multiplex links, and influence of actors in the interview process. This 
took the following steps: 
1.  Who is involved in this multistakeholder process? Actor names are written on actor cards and 
distributed on a blank sheet of paper. 
2.  How are they linked? Arrows of different colors are drawn between those actors that interact 
in terms of information, advice, funding, and command relationships. 
3.  How influential are they on this multistakeholder process? “Influence towers” consisting of 
checkers pieces are put next to each actor name to indicate the influence of actors. 
4.  Participants have a qualitative discussion about how and why (this method expands the 
approach of Douthwaite et al. 2006; for a detailed description of the Net-Map methodology, 
see Schiffer and Waale 2008). 
This process is portrayed in Figure 1 an example of a Net-Map drawn by one of the board 
members. 
Figure 1. Net-Map drawn by one of the board members 
 
Source: Eva Schiffer 2008 
The methodology led to three types of data: (1) data about influence, in our case the dependent 
variable; (2) data depicting the connection between the actors in the governance network; and (3) 
qualitative protocols of the discussion and explanation that occurred while the networks were drawn. It is 
important to note that these data were not drawn by an outside analyst but by the members of the board 
themselves. The data were collected in individual interviews, and then the network and influence data 
were aggregated (stacked). The qualitative data were used to guide the interpretation of the quantitative 
data.  
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The indicator for influence (dependent variable) was introduced to the analysis as a discrete 
variable whose value was established by the interviewees (corresponding to the number of checkers 
pieces interviewees put on towers to indicate the influence of an actor). The values were normalized by 
setting the highest value per interview equal to 1 and the lowest equal to 0. The influence indicators for 
each of the stakeholders were averaged across the interviews to derive an overall influence indicator for 
each of the stakeholders. The independent variables used in the study described the embeddedness of 
actors in the wider social network of stakeholders. The Basin Board consists of 17 individual members 
who represent different organizations of government, NGOs, and traditional authorities. To derive a 
balanced picture, all 17 board members were interviewed. However, the networks they drew included not 
just other board members but also external actors that could influence the activities, decisions, and 
achievements of the board (Table 2 shows this mix of board members and external actors. In individual 
interviews, each of the board members was asked to describe the relationships in terms of (1) exchange of 
information, (2) giving and receiving advice, (3) providing and receiving funds, and (4) giving and 
receiving command, and a map was drawn accordingly (see Figure 1). Through this interview process a 
list of 149 actors was developed. Reciprocity of the relationships was assumed; that is, if one board 
member indicated the existence of collaboration, the collaborator is assumed to indicate collaboration 
with that same organization in return. The ego-networks derived from the interviews were put together 
(stacked) to build overall cognitive networks (Krackhardt 1987a). Cognitive networks combine the 
perspectives of a number of the actors involved so that the multiple perspectives even out the biases and 
blind spots of the individual actors. The result of this process was four networks, each combining the 
view of 17 interview partners on 
•  information flow (network 1), 
•  giving advice (network 2), 
•  flow of funds (network 3), and 
•  giving command (network 4), respectively. 
These cognitive networks were then subjected to various social network analysis operations using 
UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002), deriving specific network indicators for each of 
the 149 actors. 
Further, descriptive variables were used to specify the 149 actors with regard to the type of 
organization (public-central, public-local, private, nongovernmental, community, other) and the physical 
distance between them. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the study. 
Table 1. Variables used 
Variable  Type 
Contextual 
Type of actor  Categorical (government, private-sector 
organization, nongovernmental organization, 
civil-society organization, traditional 
authority, donor, faith-based organization) 
Level of actor  Categorical (local, district, regional, national, 
international) 
Dependent (influence in decisionmaking) 
Influence (average)  Continuous (index) 
Influence (sum across 17)  Continuous (index) 
Influence (count across 17)  Continuous (index) 
Influence (average across 17)  Continuous (index) 
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Table 1. Continued 
Variable  Type 
Contextual 
Independent (indicators of embeddedness in various networks) 
Degree centrality in information network  Continuous (index) 
Out-degree centrality in command network  Continuous (index) 
Constraint in funding network  Continuous (index) 
Out-degree centrality in command network  Continuous (index) 
Out-degree centrality in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Betweenness centrality in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Coordinator function between types of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Consultant function between types of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Gatekeeper function between types of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Representative function between types of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Liaison function between types of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Coordinator function between levels of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Consultant function between levels of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Gatekeeper function between levels of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Representative function between levels of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Liaison function between levels of actors in advice network  Continuous (index) 
Source: Author’s creation, describing variables for data analysis. 
In the analysis, we first developed measures of network embeddedness and then drew network 
maps that depicted the position of actors in the four networks, the information exchange network, the 
funding network, the command network, and the advice network. The bivariate relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables were then analyzed with simple measures of correlation, again using 
UCINET software. In the following, we provide brief descriptions of the network analysis methods used 
to derive the independent variables: 
1.  Degree centrality corresponds to the count of ties each board member has with stakeholders 
in the wider information-exchange, advice, funding, and command networks, normalized by 
the maximum number of stakeholders to which each member could be affiliated. 
2.  Out-degree centrality is a type of degree centrality that takes into consideration only the 
outgoing ties of an actor. The measure relates closely to the influence an actor is able to 
impose on other actors, for example, giving commands or giving advice. 
3.  Betweenness centrality indicates how often an actor sits on the shortest (geodesic) path 
between other pairs of actors in the network. Hence the measure depicts to what extent an 
actor can become a powerful broker in the network because other actors have no alternative 
efficient ways of connection apart from this broker. A high betweenness centrality allows an 
actor to control the interactions of others. 
4.  Constraint is a measure that indexes how far an actor is linked to alters that would need to 
link up with this actor to get access to the network. It describes the extent to which the 
relationship between a network actor and each of the alters in the actor’s neighborhood limits 
the actor to exercise power over alters; if the alters have alternative ways to connect to the 
rest of the network, the actor is more constrained.  
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5.  Brokerage (coordinator, consultant, gatekeeper, representative, liaison function) assesses the 
extent to which a network actor enables the relationship between two alters. Depending on 
the affiliation of the broker and the two stakeholders to different predefined subgroups,
2
The next step entailed combining the relational variables found as key determinants of power in 
the governance system in regression analysis using standard ordinary least squares procedures. The results 
from the ordinary least squares estimation as well as the bivariate correlation analysis (Pearson’s and 
Kendall’s Tau B coefficients) were then tested with UCINET software, which is instrumental for running 
diverse statistical testing procedures by simulation (randomization) and running permutation-based 
significance tests (Baker and Hubert 1981; Krackhardt 1987b, 1988; Snijders and Borgatti 1999; 
Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
 the 
broker can act as a coordinator, consultant, gatekeeper, representative, or liaison. A 
coordinator is a network member who brokers the relationships between actors of the same 
group to which the broker belongs, a consultant brokers the relation of two actors of the same 
group without being a member of that group, a gatekeeper operates at the boundary of a 
group and brokers access of outsiders to the group, a representative brokers the relationship 
of an actor in his or her own group with an actor in another group, and a liaison brokers a 
relation between members of two different groups without being a part of either. For each 
actor in the network expected values under random assignment to each of the five broker 
categories can be calculated and be compared with their actual scores. 
The rationale for the application of permutation testing procedures is as follows (see Monge, 
Hartwich, and Halgin 2008): as relational data are, by definition, nonindependent, their statistical analyses 
should not be undertaken using standard statistical procedures. The standard formulas for computing 
standard errors and inferential tests on attributes in correlations and regressions generally assume 
independent observations. Applying them when the observations are not independent can be misleading. 
In general, the standard inferential formulas for computing sampling variability (meaning, standard 
errors) give unrealistically small values for network data. Using standard inferential formula results is the 
worst kind of inferential error—the false positive, which means rejecting the null when one should not. 
To avoid these problems, permutation approaches can be used, which calculate sampling distributions of 
statistics directly from the observed networks by using random assignment across hundreds or thousands 
of trials under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. 
Finally, a set of regression analyses using a Tobit model was applied to facilitate understanding of 
multivariate effects at the individual level of power in the governance system that each actor exercises. 
Various models were run including or excluding certain explanatory variables, testing their combined 
effect and the robustness of the results. 
                                                       
2 In this study we used categories related to the hierarchical level, that is, international, national, regional, district, or local 
level, and to the type of organization/actor, that is, government, nongovernmental organization, private organization, community, 
research, donor, or faith-based organization.  
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4. RESULTS 
In the following section, we first conduct a descriptive analysis of actors participating in the information 
exchange, funding, command, and advice networks and present specific features of those networks to 
depict the structural patterns of interactions the board members maintain with a range of stakeholders. In 
the next section we analyze bivariate relationships between measures of influence in governance systems 
and measures of network embeddedness before, in the last section; we test for multivariate effects on 
influence. 
Types of Actors  
The network of stakeholders was generated from information gathered during interviews with key actors 
(representatives on the Basin Board) who were asked which actors they deemed important in the 
governance of the White Volta Basin. The resulting cognitive network of 149 organizations and actors 
reflects the perceptions of these key actors; as such it is the approximation of the true stakeholder 
network. The latter is an image of the relationships of all stakeholders in water governance in the White 
Volta Basin watershed as it is perceived by the totality of the 17 stakeholders represented on the Basin 
Board. 
According to the properties of a scale-free network (Barabási 2003), the number of additional 
stakeholders that would need to be included to picture the true population (network) is negligible; the 
chance that a key actor would identify another central stakeholder in watershed governance in the White 
Volta Basin in addition to the ones that are already named is marginal as important actors tend to be well 
known. We can therefore assume that our full network provides a rather complete picture of the 
connections between interest groups in the White Volta Basin, a picture that has not been drawn to date. 
Table 1 shows the types of network actors that can be found among the stakeholders in the 
governance of the White Volta Basin and the hierarchical levels at which they operate. The majority of 
organizations belong to the government, putting in question to what extent the governance system is 
actually stakeholder based and not government dominated. 
Table 2. Types of actors 
    Full network of 149 
stakeholders 
Members of the White Volta 
Basin Board 
    Frequency  Percentage  Frequency  Percentage 
Type of actor  Government  84  56.4  14  68.8 
  Nongovernmental organization/project  21  14.3  1  6.3 
  Traditional authority  5  3.4  1  12.5 
  Civil-society organization  21  14.1  0  0.0 
  Private-sector organization  4  2.7  0  0.0 
  Research organization  7  4.7  1  6.3 
  Donor  4  2.7  0  6.3 
  Faith-based organization  3  2.0  0  0.0 
           
Hierarchical 
level 
Local  25  16.8  0  0.0 
District  20  13.4  7  41.2 
  Regional  39  26.2  9  52.9 
  National  44  29.5  1  5.9 
  International  21  14.1  0  0.0 
  Total  149  100.0  17  100.0  
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Source: Authors creation, from data analysis. 
The representation of stakeholders on the governing board somehow reflects their involvement in 
the wider network. However, community-based organizations as well as civil-society, private-sector, and 
faith-based organizations are not represented at all on the board, and NGOs/projects are less represented 
whereas government organizations are more prominently represented. 
Network Properties of Social Interaction among Stakeholders in the Watershed 
Figures 2 through 5 depict the cognitive networks as perceived by the board members; that mean each of 
the individual perceptions of the relationships in the stakeholder network (the ego-networks) were stacked 
together, avoiding double count, to produce a network that includes the perceptions of all 17 individuals.
3  
The positions of the nodes in the network were established on the basis of an algorithm that allows for the 
visualization of the relative distances and positions of actors and events in the network.
4
Table 3. Well-connected stakeholders in the governance of the White Volta Basin 
  The size of the 
nodes in the graphs corresponds to the number of collaborations the organization maintains (degree 
centrality). Table 3 presents centrality measures for the actors on the Basin Board in all four networks. 
Actor Name  Degree 















Members of the Basin Board 
         
District Assembly Administration (DA admin)  41  34  62  74 
Regional Coordinating Council (RCC)  19  5  39  39 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  13  3  13  41 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, regional 
(MoFA-Reg) 
18  7  6  31 
Regional Community Water & Sanitation 
Agency (CWSA_Reg) 
12  5  1  21 
District Assembly members (DA_Mem)  6  2  2  13 
Individual District Assembly Staff members 
(DA_Staff) 
5  1  1  13 
District Water and Sanitation teams (DWST)  7  1  1  6 
Basin officer (BO)  2  2  0  2 
Savannah Agricultural Research Institute 
(SARI) 
1  3  0  4 
Department of Women's Affairs (Dept_Wo)  3  1  0  0 
Regional House of Chiefs (Chiefs_Reg)  2  3  2  8 
White Volta Basin Board (WVBB)  3  22  5  37 
 
                                                       
3 Imagine a process similar to stacking 17 transparent slides with networks drawn on them on top of each other. 
4 NetDraw, the software used for plotting the graphs in the figures, locates nodes in a two-dimensional space according to 
the so called spring-embedding algorithm on the basis of the following criteria: (1) observability (avoiding overlap), (2) the 
number of ties each agent has (agents with higher degree centrality, that is, more ingoing and outgoing ties, are closer to the 
center of the network), and (3) maintenance of the same length for all ties. The size of the nodes in the graphs corresponds to the 
number of ties each actor maintains in the network (degree centrality). NetDraw is part of the UCINET for Windows software 
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002), which was used to analyze the data.  
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Table 3. Continued 
Actor Name  Degree 















Members of the Basin Board 
Other stakeholders 
Chiefs  12  12  3  32 
Government of Ghana (GoG)  15  9  14  14 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development (MoLGRD)  11  6  2  11 
Regional minister (Reg_Min)  9  4  1  3 
Tindanas/traditional earth priests  2  3  1  13 
Water Resources Commission (WRC)  9  11  5  10 
Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing 
(Mo_WRWH)  8  7  5  6 
President of Ghana (President)  7  7  1  6 
Donors  6  10  6  6 
Ministry of Women & Children’s Affairs 
(MoWomen)  3  5  3  6 
Water Aid (Water_Aid)  3  4  4  2 
Area Council, local government (Area_C)  2  3  3  6 
National House of Chiefs (Chiefs_Nat)  2  1  2  3 
Forestry Commission (CoForest)  2  7  3  13 
Council for Scientific & Industrial Research 
(CSIR)  2  4  1  0 
District chief executive (DCE)  2  3  0  4 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, national 
(MoFA_Nat)  2  3  1  6 
Ministry of Mines (Mo_Mines)  2  0  1  0 
Regional Planning Unit (RPU)  2  6  1  6 
Courts, regional level (Courts_Reg)  1  2  1  2 
Department of Feeder Roads (Courts_Nat)  1  1  1  3 
Department of Town and Country Planning 
(Dept_TCP)  1  3  1  5 
Ghana Education Service, regional level 
(GES_Reg)  1  3  3  4 
Environmental Health and Sanitation Unit 
(EHSU)  1  3  1  10 
Ghana Health Service (Health_S)  1  1  1  4 
Source: Authors (from data analysis). 
Information Exchange 
Figure 2 shows that most organizations represented on the White Volta Basin Board, such as the District 
Assembly Administration, Regional Coordinating Council, and Environmental Protection Agency are 
located in the center of the graph, maintaining a substantial amount of information exchange 
relationships. The two best-connected institutions in terms of information exchange, the District  
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Assembly Administration and the Regional Coordinating Council, both act as coordinating units of the 
decentralized regional and district government, pointing toward the dominance of the government in the 
network. This is surprising given that governments, besides sending out extension agents and exchanging 
information about planned and accomplished activities, are often less prominent in the exchange of 
informally transferred information. However, among government organizations, it is not those concerned 
with specific content (such as agriculture, environmental protection, and so on), but the co-coordinating 
administrative units at both the regional level and the district level that are considered information hubs 
by the Basin Board members. Apparently the coordinating units maintain connections to actors from 
different domains such as the NGO sector and civil society. This might be due to the fact that the content 
agencies link only to specific audiences, whereas the coordinating units link to a wide variety of 
audiences. 
Figure 2. Information network 
 
Source: Authors’ creation (from data analysis)  
Meanwhile, there are a good number of stakeholders in the full network that exchange 
information with only one or two actors, pointing to many actors’ dependency on just a few others for 
access to information. Among those are a few members of the Basin Board, such as the Savannah 
Agricultural Research Institute (SARI), an agency that is physically located outside the boundaries of the 
area that the Basin Board is responsible for, and the Department of Women’s Affairs (Dept_Wo), an 
agency that is only marginally concerned with water-related issues. Also, there are a good number of 
community-based actors such as the Water Board (community-based water boards for the management of 
small-town water systems), WATSAN (community-based Water and Sanitation Committees for the 
management of individual boreholes), boat owners, and teachers with only one link into the network, 
suggesting that they act only as recipients of information. In the interviews, board members emphasized 
that these local actors are among the core audience for their work. Thus, the lack of connectivity of local 
actors might pose a problem in achieving the board’s goals. Other less-connected actors are organizations  
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at the national and international levels. There is also an intermediary group of actors that maintains more 
than two information exchange relationships. 
Funding Relations 
Figure 3 illustrates the network graph of funding relationships; the lines depict who provides funding to 
whom, reflecting the interview partners’ perceptions. It is a picture of who is funding work in the area of 
the Volta Basin as perceived by the members of the Basin Board. Funding in this context means both the 
provision of government funds and the contributions of external donors. Interviewees saw funding as a 
rather linear activity, mostly following formal hierarchies, with a high number of actors being directly 
connected to the same hub. 
Figure 3. Funding network 
 
Source: Authors’ creation (from data analysis). 
DA admin (District Administration) is represented as the best-connected actor in the funding 
network. This can be explained by the way that the decentralized government in Ghana is structured: most 
of the implementation of government activities (for example, building of infrastructure, agricultural 
extension work, and so on) is organized and implemented at the district level, whereas the regional 
administration has a rather weak and coordinating role. Thus, other actors, such as the national 
administration and donors, will channel the money for projects on the ground through the district 
administration. As observations on the ground confirm, however, the high number of links does not 
necessarily indicate a big size of funding flows. Similarly, the MoFi (Ministry of Finance and the Govt. 
(national government) are represented as well-connected actors in the finance network. This is mainly due 
to their role in the administrative system as funding distribution coordinators and decisionmakers. It is 
surprising that donors do not have a more central role in funding. This may be due to the increasing 
tendency of donors to provide general budgetary support to governments and not to be involved in the  
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day-to-day activities at a regional level. In fact, one of the main donors to the White Volta Basin project, 
the Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), has been actively involved in carving the 
organizational setup of this multistakeholder mechanism, the Basin Board, in its initial phases. Although a 
DANIDA representative still is actively involved in advising the Basin Board and its national parent body 
the Water Resources Commission, board members did not perceive the donor agency to be setting the 
agenda; rather, the perception was that the agenda was set through the multistakeholder process in place 
and implemented largely by the government’s channeling money from donors to local actors. In the 
perception of board members, it was the national Water Resources Commission (a national-level 
multistakeholder board, the parent body of the Basin Board) that was seen as the most influential external 
actor in agenda setting. From the point of view of a subnational initiative such as the Basin Board, the 
government organizations act rather as gatekeepers and brokers for funding. Most activities related to the 
management of the White Volta Basin are budgeted and implemented at the lower government district 
level, whereas the regional administration (Regional Coordinating Council) mainly has a coordinating 
function, without access to funding to support activities. 
Closely related to the above argument about gate-keeping is that about constraint: as mentioned 
before, an actor is constrained if it provides funding to others that could also receive funding from other 
sources. Those that constitute the only funding source to others do not have a constraint in exercising 
power over those others. Table 4 presents the constraint index for the funding network as computed by 
UCINET (an actor with a high constraint index funds agencies that have a lot of alternative funding 
sources, and an actor with a low constraint index funds agencies that basically rely on this actor for 
funding). 
Table 4. Constraint index (CI) measures for actors in funding network 
Range   Actors in category  n 
CI ≤ 0.2  District Chief Executive, RD_Agric, Reg_Police_Com, AEA, Basket_WA, Boat_Owner, 
Ministry of Water Resources in Burkina Faso, C_nurses, CBNFSP, CBRDP, CHRAJ, 
Cit_abroad, Co_Culture, CSO, Dept_Info, Department of Women’s Affairs in Burkina 
Faso, Fisherfolk, IBIS, Judiciary, Media, Mo_BCER, Mo_Envi, Mo_Fish, Mo_NEPAD, 
Mo_Tourism, Mo_Trade, NSBCP, Oncho, Opinion_L, Pres_Reg_Chiefs, Priv_Sec, 
RING, Small_users, Teachers, UDS, UNDP, Unit_C, VRA, WATSAN, Wo_Groups, 
Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing, Mo_FA_Reg, NGOA, national 
government, Mo_Fin, District Assembly Administration 
46 
0.2 ≤ CI < 0.4  GWC, Regional Coordinating Council, Edu_Reg, Rural_Aid, Co_Forest, Communities, 
Water Resources Commission, Mo_Women, Meteo, Donors, Regional Community Water 
& Sanitation Agency, Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, Water Aid 
13 
0.4 ≤ CI < 0.6  Security, REPU, Council for Scientific & Industrial Research, Department of Feeder 
Roads, Courts Regional Level, CWSA_Nat, Dept_FRoads, Department of Town and 
Country Planning, Ghana Health Service, Att_Gen, BACH, CP40, DHMT, GLOWA, 
NADMO, Dept_Forest, NGOs, Co_Lands, National House of Chiefs, Regional House of 
Chiefs, PAGEV, Environmental Protection Agency, WRI, White Volta Basin Board, 
DADU 
25 
0.6 ≤ CI < 0.8  District Water and Sanitation Teams, FBO, CONNIWAS, Chiefs, Area Council, local 
government, Hydro, District Assembly Members, Environmental Health and Sanitation 
Unit, Co_Wo, Individual District Assembly Staff members, Edu_Dist, Env_Clubs, Basin 
Officer, Mo_LGRD, Tindanas, Mo_FA_Nat, Mo_FA_Dist 
17 
0.8 ≤ CI  CARE, Regional Minister, President of Ghana, Ministry of Mines, Cabinet, Mo_Comm, 
Mo_Edu, Mo_Health, Mo_Interior, Mo_Lands, MP, PM_DA, Speaker_o_P, Act_Aid, 
Adm_CF, Afr_Dev_Org, BChurchA, BMBF, Co_Minerals, Courts_Dist, CWST, 
DANIDA, Dept Child, Dept_CD, Department of Women's Affairs, DISCAP, Dist_TCP, 
Drilling_C, East_Ag, EU_Micro_P, Faith_BO, Farmers, Fire_S, FRoads_Dist, Fulani, 
Gender_DO, GIDA, IFPRI, MDAs, Mo_Chiefs, NCCE, Parliament, W_Vision, 
Water_Board, WB, WUA, ZOVFA, ADRA 
48 
Source: Author’s compilation from data analysis.  
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One finds in Table 4 that there is a large number (48) of highly constrained actors. Interestingly it 
is in this category that most of the traditional funding agencies can be found. This seems to confirm the 
argument made above that donors do not really set the agenda not only because they channel their funds 
through government organizations but also because they are too constrained: beneficiaries can choose 
between too many alternative funding sources to allow donors to impose their agendas and influence 
decisionmaking. This links into the debate about the need for increased donor coordination. However, the 
main donor to the White Volta Basin Board, DANIDA, is found in the category of low-constraint actors. 
So although donors in general cannot be seen as having the power to set the agenda through exclusive 
funding relationships, the specific role of the major donor is different. This is reflected in the role that 
representatives of DANIDA take up in the field, having a staff member seconded to the Water Resources 
Commission (White Volta Basin Board’s national equivalent) who takes an active role in the day-to-day 
and strategic activities of the Water Resources Commission and visits the Basin Board as part of the 
Water Resources Commission team. However, in discussion with the board members, this active 
involvement was seen as advice rather than agenda setting. The board members’ understanding was that 
DANIDA’s funding was crucial in putting the Basin Board into existence but not in setting and achieving 
its goals. 
Lines of Command 
Figure 4 shows the command network, depicting structures of formal hierarchy. In a command link an 
actor can force his or her will on another actor and apply sanctioning in case of noncompliance. The link 
was not only limited to the formal government hierarchies but could also extend to traditional chiefs who 
at times enforced compliance on local community members. Figure 4 shows directional ties; the arrows 
depict who gives command to whom. 
It appears that the same organizations are central as are central in the information exchange 
network but that the entire network is less dense (density = 0.0114, standard deviation = 0.1701) 
compared to the information exchange network (density = 0.0372, standard deviation = 0.2887). It is not a 
surprise that in the pluralistic multistakeholder governance system that the 17 interviewees described 
through their network maps, giving and receiving command is a less frequent activity than exchanging 
information. Although all governmental actors, traditional authorities, and community-based actors are 
included in this network, faith-based organizations and some NGOs are not parts of it. Basically, the 
command network has two central hubs that give command to two distinct sets of actors: the District 
Assembly Administration is central in giving command to all governmental agencies at the district level, 
and the Regional Coordinating Council is central in giving command to all governmental actors at the 
regional level. A number of national-level actors are depicted as giving command to their lower-level 
counterparts, but no national-level hub was described. Community-based actors are mainly seen as 
receiving formal command from traditional authorities (chiefs) and not from government actors. This 
might indicate the reason for involving a representative of the regional house of chiefs on the Basin 
Board. It was a generally shared understanding among interview partners that due to traditional 
authorities’ local presence and authority, they were the most important partners at the local level, 
especially when it came to being able to enforce compliance. However, it is important to note that in the 
culture of northern Ghana, the chiefs do not form a hierarchical system among themselves, and thus the 
head of the regional house of chiefs cannot give command but rather only advise his fellow chiefs at the 
village level.  
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Figure 4. Command network 
 
Source: Authors’ creation from data analysis. 
Giving and Receiving Advice 
Figure 5 shows the advice network, depicting the relationships in which actors try to change other actors’ 
behavior by giving advice without being able to enforce a change of behavior. Again, the District 
Assembly Administration is very central, but there are also a large number of intermediary organizations 
that are involved in giving and receiving advice; the advice network seems to be less hierarchical than the 
funding and command networks. Apparently, advice and information are the flows that link different 
actors irrespective of the kind of organization, domain, level of actor, and formal hierarchies. They 
involve the biggest number of the actors and integrate those that are isolates in the formal command and 
funding networks. The information and advice networks include informal links and are as such crucial for 
making this vision of intersectoral coordination within a multistakeholder governance system a reality in 
the presence of formal (hierarchical) networks. This is especially crucial for integrating the 
nongovernmental actors (civil-society organizations, NGOs, faith-based organizations, private-sector 
organizations) and their partners across the border in Burkina Faso (the Ministry of Water Resources and 
the Department of Women’s Affairs).  
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Figure 5. Advice network 
 
Source: Authors’ creation from data analysis. 
Note: See Table 3 for full titles of abbreviations. 
Advice Brokerage 
Table 5 shows the number of brokerage functions each actor plays in the advice network linking different 
types of organizations (governments, NGOs, private-sector organizations, community-based 
organizations, faith-based organizations, and others) and different hierarchical levels (local, district, 
regional, national, international), calculated from UCINET. 
Only seven organizations fulfilled any brokerage functions in the advice network; obviously it 
was those that had most central positions in the advice network. The White Volta Basin Board is by far 
the actor with the most brokerage functions, which might be due to its central role in the management of 
the White Volta Basin but also related to the fact that the research question revolved around the goal 
achievement of this organization. Furthermore, although the Basin Board has a strong representation of 
government actors, besides the Water Resources Commission, the Basin Board is the only actor in the 
survey that integrates representatives from different types of organizations. The White Volta Basin Board 
mainly brokers relationships between the different types of organizations, fulfilling a representational role 
that is being part of the same type of organizations and linking up other organizations. However, often it 
also brokers advice relationships, taking on the role of gatekeeper, liaison, or coordinator. In only a few 
cases, it acts as a consultant, brokering actors from two different types of organizations while not being 
part of any of those organizational types. 
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Table 5. Brokerage roles in the advice network (linking types of organizations and organizations on different hierarchy levels) 






















































































































































































































































































































































White Volta Basin 
Board 
35  12  19  16  9  19  0  5  4  15  67  67  0.733 
Water Resources 
Commission 
3  1  5  4  3  3  0  1  2  4  13  13  0.251 
PAGEV (local NGO)  0  0  0  1  3  0  0  0  0  2  3  3  0.246 
ZOVFA (local NGO)   0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  2  2  0.303 
Ministry of Water 
Resources Works and 
Housing 
2  0  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  2  2  0.009 
District Assembly 
Administration 
0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0.011 
Burk_MoWa (Ministry 
of Water Affairs in 
Burkina Faso)  
0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0.087 
Source: Authors’ compilation from data analysis. 
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Relations between Networking Properties and Stakeholder Influence 
We turn now to testing the degree of association between diverse relational characteristics of actors in the 
network and their particular influence in the decisionmaking process: how is an actor’s position in the 
network related to its influence? First we compare means of influence between the different groups of 
organizations. The first two measures average influence scores: when organizations have been repeatedly 
mentioned by different interviewees, the sum of all influence scores was divided by the number of times 
the organization was named (average influence) or by 17, that is, the number of interviewees that could 
have mentioned the organization (weighted influence). The two other measures, sum of influence and 
count of influence, represent organizations that have been named repeatedly by different interviewees 
more prominently, simply by summing them up or by counting the number of times they have been 
mentioned. The logic behind this is that more-influential actors would be mentioned more often. The 
distribution of the influence scores across categories is shown in Figures 6 and 7 in the form of box-
whisker charts depicting the mean (black line in the middle), the second and third quartile as the box, and 
the first and fourth quartiles as the whiskers. In Figure 6 some outliers are marked with os. A standard 
analysis of variance revealed that indeed the different groups have means that are significantly different. 
Donors and traditional authorities have the highest mean influence. Although both groups are 
represented by only a small number of actors, those actors were mentioned by nearly all interviewees and 
generally rated as very influential. This is remarkable because, as was shown above, the network consists 
of a majority of government actors that, when lumped together as a group, are not rated as equally 
influential. Next in average influence are NGOs/projects and, surprisingly, an actor group that is not even 
represented on the watershed management board—the private sector. The latter, however, was named by 
few interviewees; apparently the private sector is influential only in the view of some. This might either 
reflect the limited influence of the private sector or point to a blind spot in the perception of the board 
members, most of whom focused in their networks on actors similar to themselves.  
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Figure 6. Distribution of average influence (quartiles) across types of organizations 
 
Source: Authors’ creation from data analysis.  
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization. 
The government, despite its prominent representation in the network and on the board, has only a 
mean influence score per unit that lies slightly below the average. Certainly, in this group, very influential 
government organizations have been lumped together with less influential ones. Influence is distributed 
across hierarchical levels pretty equally, the only exception being regional organizations, which lie 
slightly above the average. Differences in mean influence scores, however, have to be considered with 
caution. We tested whether the type of group the actors are affiliated with can explain variations in the 
influence score, and the tests revealed no significance for any of the four types of influence scores. 
According to our data from northern Ghana, knowing the group an actor is affiliated with does not explain 
whether the actor is influential.  
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Figure 7. Distribution of weighted influence (quartiles) across hierarchical level 
 
Source: Authors’ creation from data analysis. 
Table 6 presents the averages and standard deviations for all network variables considered in this 
section and shows the degree of association among them. Correlation tests were conducted following two 
approaches: Pearson correlation coefficients were used because both variables were of a continuous or 
interval nature. Permutation-based significance tests were conducted, and their results are indicated. 
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Table 6. Correlations between variables of social interactions and influence 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Correlation parameter  X1  X2  X3  X4  Y1  Y2  Y3  Y4 
X1. Average influence according to 
individual interviews 
0.26448  0.22383  Pearson correlation  —               
Significance (two-tailed test)                 
X2. Sum of influence according to 
individual interviews 
0.91309  1.77548  Pearson correlation  .533***  —             
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000                
X3. Count of influence according 
to individual interviews 
2.51  3.015  Pearson correlation  .372***  .938***  —           
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000  .000             
X4. Weighted influence according 
to individual interviews 
0.05377  0.10439  Pearson correlation  .533***  1.000***  .938***  —         
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000  .000  .000           
Y1. Out-degree centrality in 
command network 
1.68  6.389  Pearson correlation  .304***  .701***  .623***  .701***  —       
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000  .000  .000  .000         
Y2. Degree centrality in 
information network 
3.07  5.069  Pearson correlation  .448***  .877***  .842***  .877***  .755***  —     
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000       
Y3. Out-degree centrality in advice 
network 
4.24  9.143  Pearson correlation  .354***  .900***  .905***  .900***  .818***  .870***  —   
Significance (two-tailed test)  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000     
Y4. Constraint in advice network  0.47342  0.36678  Pearson correlation  –.085  –.217***  –
.228*** 
–.217***  –.187**  –
.255*** 
–.219***  — 
Significance (two-tailed test)  .303  .008  .005  .008  .022  .002  .007    
Y5. Betweenness centrality in 
advice network 
0.60943  2.97394  Pearson correlation  .261***  .722***  .649***  .723***  .840***  .781***  .822***  –.162** 
Significance (two-tailed test)  .001  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000  .048 
Source: Authors’ compilation from data analysis. 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the .05 level, two-tailed. ***Correlation is significant at the .01 level, two-tailed.  
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With one exception (relation between X1, average influence according to individual interviews, 
and Y4, constraint in advice network) all variables included in the calculations to reflect network 
interaction (independent variables Y1 to Y4) yielded significant correlations with influence indicators 
(dependent variables X1 to X4). However, the correlation was also high among variables within the two 
groups, indicating high levels of intercorrelation. 
The bivariate analysis suggests that stakeholders in the governance of the White Volta Basin have 
more influence in making decisions that lead to achieving environmental and development goals set by 
the Basin Board if 
•  there are more actors that the stakeholders command (higher centrality in out-degree command 
relations), 
•  stakeholders participate more prominently in information exchange (higher centrality in the 
information exchange network), 
•  they provide more advice to others (higher centrality in out-degree advice relations), 
•  they provide funding to actors that do not have alternative sources (less constraint in the funding 
network), and 
•  they connect other actors that do not have alternative efficient ways to connect themselves to 
others (betweenness centrality in the advice network). 
We have seen that each of the variables we identified in Section 3 on its own seems to affect the 
level of influence actors have in making water resource management decisions. However, the question 
remains: what happens if these variables influence the dependent variable influence simultaneously? 
Behind this lies the idea that power and influence depend on the embeddedness of actors in a range of 
social networks of which the information exchange, command, funding, and advice relationships are only 
one part. For example, more centrality in one network may compensate for the actor’s more marginal 
positions in other networks. Without going further into detail about a particular social model, we tested 
for the simultaneous effects of our dependent variables on influence, applying a multivariate Tobit 
regression model. A robust model was applied to control for heteroscedasticity effects, meaning the bias 
from the variance of the residuals. Various models were run including or excluding certain explanatory 
variables and testing their combined effect and the robustness of the results. Tobits are censored normal 
regression models that fit the type of dependent variable used in this study (an index ranging from 0 to 1). 
We included all relational (network) variables. From the list of dependent variables, we selected only the 
two most relevant ones. The first model included sum of influence as its dependent variable, and the 
second model included weighted influence. Regression results are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Tobit regression coefficients for the diverse models of influence  
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
Sigma (intercept)  .180 (.031)***  –.003 (.006) 
Out-degree centrality in command network  .003 (.005)  –.002 (.001) 
Degree centrality in information network  .028 (.007)***  .009 (.001)*** 
Out-degree centrality in advice network  –.001 (.004)  .008 (.001)***  
Constraint in funding network  .020 (.042)  .002 (.008)  
Betweenness centrality in advice network  –.020 (.012)*  –.003 (.002) 
Fit measures 











Source: Authors’ creation from data analysis. 
Notes:  N = 149 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
ANOVA = analysis of variance;  DECOMP = Decomposition (common procedure to estimate fit of Tobit models) 
*p < .10. ***p < .01.   
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The results in Table 7 show that our network variables can better explain the variance in weighted 
influence than in average influence. In fact, model 2 seems to be a more comfortable model to explain 
how influence is determined. Both variables, degree centrality in the information network and out-degree 
centrality in the advice network, positively contribute to weighted influence. Effects of out-degree 
centrality in the command network, constraint in funding, and betweenness centrality in the advice 
network are not significant. 
The multivariate analysis suggests that stakeholders in water resource management have more 
influence in making decisions that lead to achieving environmental and development goals if 
•  they participate more prominently in information exchange (higher centrality in the information 
exchange network) and 
•  they provide more advice to others (higher centrality in out-degree advice relations). 
Resume of Results and Discussion 
Based on the data analysis we feel comfortable adopting 
•  Hypothesis 1: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on the way they are 
embedded in the exchange of information among network actors, and 
•  Hypothesis 4: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on the way they are 
embedded in giving advice. 
However, despite the fact that the bivariate analysis supports all these statements, due to the 
results of the multivariate analysis, we still are doubtful about 
•  Hypothesis 2: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on the constraints 
they face to providing funding; if others do not need an actor to acquire funding, the actor is 
less influential; 
•  Hypothesis 3: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on the extent to 
which they can command the actors in the network; and 
•  Hypothesis 5: The influence of actors in a governance network depends on their ability to link 
different network groups and broker the communication of advice  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We analyzed the case of a multistakeholder governance board for water resource management in northern 
Ghana. For this purpose we constructed networks of all stakeholders in water resource management based 
on the collective understanding of social relationships among stakeholders of the representatives of 17 
organizations on the governance board of the watershed. The networks represent partial aspects such as 
information exchange, advice giving, receipt of funding, and command relationships of the 
multistakeholder governance system. In particular, we investigated to what extent position in these 
governance networks affects the influence of actors in achieving governance goals. 
When compared to the definition of multistakeholder governance provided by a document such as 
Agenda 21, the Basin Board falls short in terms of inclusiveness. Both the board itself and the governance 
network in which it acts are strongly biased toward governmental agencies and decisionmakers and do not 
give a strong voice to nongovernmental actors, civil society, and the private sector. However, going from 
who is represented on the board to who is actually influencing the decisionmaking process, the picture 
changes. In fact, the study finds strong correlations between the perceived influence of actors and their 
positions in the information and advice networks, whereas there was no significant correlation between 
their influence and their positions in the command or funding networks. This points to the central role that 
knowledge brokers play in decisionmaking in the watershed; their influence is based on the informal 
networks they maintain with a large number of actors. Effective communication regarding the exchange 
of information and advice is a prerequisite for this influence to happen. Additionally we found that donor 
influence did not significantly distort the decisionmaking process in the multistakeholder governance 
system. 
There are four issues that result from these findings: 
The power of those that are central in the information network. The study shows that actors 
such as the District Assembly Administration, Regional Coordinating Council, and Environmental 
Protection Agency are central in the information network and are seen as very influential in 
multistakeholder governance. This is especially crucial in a setting such as rural northern Ghana, where 
the acquisition and distribution of information is hampered by high logistical cost and deficient 
infrastructure. However, in recognizing the importance of an actor’s position in the information network, 
there are also some risks and challenges that need to be considered. If access to information increases the 
influence of actors, there is an incentive for influential actors to abuse their positions by sharing only with 
selected partners in the network. Thus, accountability, best practice procedures, and monitoring of 
information flow are crucial to making sure that the system is fair and inclusive. Observations on the 
ground showed that the information exchange at board meetings led to a lot of cross-sectoral learning of 
individual board members. The challenge remains, however, to ensure that board members carry this new 
knowledge into their organizations and that actors that are not represented on the board also benefit from 
this information exchange. This points especially to the low representation of nongovernmental actors 
(NGOs, private-sector organizations, and community-based organizations) on the board. 
The influence of those giving advice. In this multistakeholder network with organizations of 
different kinds and organizational structures, giving advice was seen as one of the most powerful ways of 
influencing natural resources governance. Actors that give advice support a certain course of action but 
have no means of enforcing compliance. To be able to give good advice, actors need to have access to 
valid information, make a reasonable decision about the actions needed, and have viable advice 
relationships with other actors that trust their judgment. Thus, for affecting multistakeholder governance 
it is recommendable to invest (time, money, human capital, social capital) in this process of developing 
advisory capacities. This is relevant both for actors in the field and for external actors such as donors 
when they decide on their priorities. Both information networks and advice networks can be formal and 
informal; thus, the concerns about elite capture, exclusiveness, and transparency of networks mentioned 
above are also valid for the advice network. As overlapping hierarchies and lack of enforcement capacity 
reduce the effectiveness of formal command, giving advice becomes a more important tool for  
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collaborative governance. For many actors in the field this requires a radical change in approach, from 
worrying about, “How can we enforce this?” to considering, “Why would a farmer want to do this? What 
is their added benefit?” 
No significant influence effects of being central in the command network. At first glance it 
might seem as if those actors that can dictate and enforce action should be most influential in any 
governance field. Thus, it might be surprising that there were no significant correlations between high 
out-degree centrality (giving command) in the command network and the influence of actors. The 
governance system integrates many organizations from different sectors and levels, some of which are 
linked by command relationships (such as national and regional offices of a ministry) and others that may 
collaborate as partners with no explicit hierarchy (for example, two regional offices of different ministries 
or a governmental organization and an NGO). Furthermore, in the Ghanaian system there is an overlap of 
different hierarchy systems, involving modern and traditional authorities. For those involved in 
multistakeholder governance, it is important to realize the limited reach of top-down authoritarian 
approaches and to adapt strategies accordingly. Experience in the field shows that a lot of the 
governmental actors are still in a learning process toward this change of approach and that further 
capacity building and strategic support would be needed to develop their full potential. 
No significant influence effects of being central in the funding network. In the general 
analysis we could not prove the hypothesis that being well connected in the funding network increases the 
influence of actors in multistakeholder decisionmaking processes. This is surprising, especially in a 
resource-poor environment such as northern Ghana. This result might have something to do with the 
diversity of funding sources (both governmental and donor agencies) for the activities on the ground, so 
that few actors reached the status of having limited constraint and being able to dictate the terms. 
However, the specific role of the major donor (DANIDA) of the Basin Board might not be sufficiently 
reflected in the general analysis. In future analyses of funding networks it might make sense to include 
weighted links to better understand the amount of funding flowing between two actors instead of just 
indicating that a funding relationship exists.  
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